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Abstract 
Does the procedure of entitlement affect fairness perceptions? We use a dictator game to study the question in mixed 
gender pairs. In our experiments, we vary the process of entitlement across treatments. Allocators in our dictator game 
can inherit an amount without any effort, earn an amount with effort, or inherit an amount earned by a randomly 
matched partner's effort. We find subjects allocate lower amounts to their paired partners when they are dividing an 
amount that has been earned through their own effort and allocate relatively higher amounts when dividing an amount 
that has been earned through the paired member's real effort. Results also suggest that female proposers are more 
sensitive towards variations in entitlement processes.
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1.   Introduction 
A recent burgeoning research (Sen 1995, Frey et al. 2004, Shor 2007, Chla Güth and 
Miettinen 2009) suggests that economic decision making is not outcome dependent only. It also 
depends on the procedure. Attitudes towards economic redistribution is one prominent area of 
economic decision making where notions of fairness and distributive justice can depend upon the 
reasons behind the primary (existing) distribution, as well as the process that established the 
original distribution(Fong 2001). When analyzing distributive preferences, Hoffman and Spitzer 
(1985) makes an interesting distinction between entitlements that are legally enforceable and 
claims that are morally justified to such entitlements. They point out that if procedures matter, 
then all processes of entitlements might not have the same levels of morally justified claims 
associated with them. As a result, differences in the procedures of entitlements can influence 
perceptions of fairness. Consequently, what constitutes a fair allocation must depend on the very 
process of entitlement itself. 
We investigate whether changes in entitlement procedures influence perceptions of 
morally justified claims to the entitlement. To that end, we use a within subjects design, and 
systematically vary the process of entitlement for subjects in a dictator game. We evaluate the 
issue of procedural fairness in a mixed gender pair environment, where allocators and receivers 
are always of the opposite gender. Our results suggest that subjects allocate the least amount to 
their paired partners when dividing an amount earned through own effort and allocate the most 
when dividing an amount earned by the paired member’s real effort. Results also indicate that 
female proposers are more sensitive towards variations in entitlement conditions.  
2.   Previous Results 
Our experiment speaks to two different areas of experimental research. The first is on 
distributive justice. The notion that moral claims towards property rights can be different due to 
the method of entitlement was first investigated by Hoffman and Spitzer (1985). They had an 
intricate across-subjects design that included legally binding side payments and publicly-given 
final payments. They found that the frequency of self-regarding choices increased when subjects 
won the rights to be the proposers as compared to a situation where subjects were randomly 
assigned to be the proposers. Hoffman et al. (1994) used a similar idea in an ultimatum game 
where they used performances in a current events quiz to rank subjects from high scorers to low 
scorers and the right to be the allocator was “earned” by scoring high on the general knowledge 
quiz. They found that allocators behaved in a more self-regarding manner when the right to 
allocate was earned. Guth and Tietz (1986) found that if first and second mover rights in the 
ultimatum game were auctioned off then offers to second movers were reduced considerably. 
Rutström and Williams (2009) tested the existence of preferences over income distributions 
motivated by earnings-based justice.  Subjects participated in a two stage process where in the 
first stage they solved the Tower of Hanoi game to earn their entitlements and in the second 
phase made their distribution choices. Contrary to earlier findings of non-selfish behavior, 
Rustrom and Williams found very little variation in behavior despite variations in how initial 
income entitlements are allocated. The authors concluded that the data could be credibly 
explained by the model of self interest. 2 
 
The second area we add to is on gender differences.
1 Findings from experiments on 
gender differences suggest that there can be differences (or the lack of it) in behavior depending 
on the nature of the task and the experimental design (Bolton and Katok 1995; Frey and Bohnet 
1995; Eckel and Grossman 1996; Eckel and Grossman 1998; Cox 2002; Carpenter et al. 2005; 
Cadsby et al. 2009). However, most of these experiments do not look at economic decision 
making in mixed gender pairings per se, even though evolutionary psychology research suggests 
that gender pairing affects economic behavior (Buss 1998). Sutter et al. (2009) and Cadsby et al. 
(2009) are the two exceptions. Sutter et al. (2009) looked at bargaining behavior between mixed 
gender and same gender pairs in a power-to-take game and found heightened competition and 
retaliation (leading to lower efficiency) in the same gender groups. Cadsby et. al. (2009) 
compared behavior of same gender with mixed gender pairings in a dictator game in a single-
blind or a double-blind protocol and found no gender effects or treatment effects.  
Our paper conceptually comes closest to the Hoffman and Spitzer (1995) (hereafter, HS), 
but is distinct in important ways. Similar to HS (1985), the central idea in our design is to elicit 
preferences for fairness as we vary the procedures of entitlement. HS found support for natural 
law principles where subjects proposed a lower amount when they put effort towards earning it. 
However, in order to be fair, one should be equally mindful of another’s claim, just as one is of 
her/his own. To evaluate this aspect of fairness, we add a Partner-effort treatment, where the 
allocator is responsible for the allocation of resources when someone else earns it. The Partner-
effort treatment provides an important test of one’s attitude towards fairness when evaluated in 
conjunction with the treatment where the allocator herself/himself earns the resources to be 
shared. We propose that our treatments collectively provide a more comprehensive test of 
attitudes towards distributive justice and especially that of desert-based principles. Further, our 
experiment design departs from the HS design in important ways. We employ a within-subjects 
design to control for subject-specific heterogeneity. This provides a better way to evaluate the 
effect of the procedure in evoking different moral claims for the same subject.
2 In contrast to HS, 
we also impose a double-blind protocol to ensure that experimenter effects are minimized. 
Finally, we add to the small but growing literature in economics experiments on bargaining 
behavior in mixed gender environments. In our treatments allocators and receivers are always of 
the opposite gender. 
3.  Experiment Design 
We chose the simplest allocation game that is devoid of any strategic considerations (Eckel 
and Grossman 1998), the dictator game. In this game the dictator (allocator) is given an amount 
of money X and asked to allocate an amount Y to a randomly matched subject (the receiver) and 
to retain (X-Y) for own self. We have three treatments in a within-subjects design to elicit 
subject’s perceptions of fairness as a function of the entitlement procedure.   
Our baseline treatment, the Inheritance treatment (I) is the standard dictator game, where 
the proposer is endowed with a fixed sum of money and asked to distribute it between his/her 
own-self and a randomly matched partner of the opposite gender. Our second treatment is the 
Own-Effort treatment (OE), where the allocator is asked to participate in a quiz in which each 
                                                            
1 See Eckel and Grossman (2009) for an extensive overview of the literature. 
2 See Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) and Keren and Raaijmakers (1988) for discussions of the relative merits of 
using a within-subjects design for our problem in hand. 3 
 
correct answer provides money earnings. The quiz consisted of counting the number of “0”s and 
“3”s that appear in ten lines of randomized numbers. At the end of the quiz, the allocators 
received information on their earnings and were asked to distribute that amount between their 
own selves and their randomly matched partners. In the third treatment, each subject’s earnings 
from the completed real effort task were shown to a randomly matched allocator who distributes 
it between his (or her) own self and the earner. This is the Partner-Effort treatment (PE). 
In each experiment session subjects participated in all the three treatments in the roles of 
both proposers and receivers. The instructions for each treatment were given sequentially and 
read aloud. The treatment orders were changed in each session (see Table 1). Subjects made 
allocation decisions in each treatment without knowing their earnings as recipients. It was 
explained to each subject that they would be randomly re-matched with a new participant in 
every treatment and only one of the treatments would be chosen for payments. At the end of the 
experiment a bingo cage was used to choose one of the three treatments for payments, and the 
chosen treatment was announced. To ensure that behavior is minimally affected by experimenter 
contact we imposed a double blind protocol (Hoffman et al. 1994, 2001; Cox and Deck 2005) in 
all our sessions. A monitor was in charge of distributing and collecting all decision sheets. The 
experimenter calculated all payments in an adjoining room. Subjects collected payments in 
sealed envelopes from a third-party who was not present during the experiment. Given our 
interest in eliciting behavior in mixed gender pairs, allocators and receivers were always of the 
opposite gender and this was explicitly mentioned in the instructions and visually re-enforced by 
separating them into two sides of the room.
3 We ran the experiments with undergraduate student 
subjects at Franklin and Marshall College (USA) and at Jadavpur University (India). A total of 
80 subjects participated in the experiment and subjects received on an average $27 in USA and 
Rs. 258 in India, inclusive of a show-up fee. Table 1 reports all session and subject information.  
4.  Results 
Alternatives theories on fairness behavior 
Before we report our results, it is useful to discuss some normative theories of 
distributive justice (Rawls 1971) that can provide us with benchmark predictions of fairness. We 
choose four candidate theories of distributive justice (see Konow 2003 and Lamont and Favor 
2008 for a review) to organize our results. Our first candidate is Utilitarianism, a welfare-based 
principle used commonly in economic analysis. In particular, neo-classical economic theory 
often deals with a special form of utilitarianism where agents have independent utility functions 
and care only about maximizing their own money income. This “economic man,” paradigm 
suggests that one will make self-regarding decisions about his economic endowments and never 
part with any economic endowment unless he is compensated economically in return. An 
implication of this self-regarding version of utilitarianism suggests that an individual who acts 
accordingly will prefer a distribution where they have more money, independent of what other 
members of the society get or any procedural concerns towards fairness. We define a strong 
version of utilitarian behavior in our experiments if allocation amounts (for the receiver) are zero 
                                                            
3 Instructions are available upon request from the author. 4 
 
in all three treatments. We also define a weak version of utilitarian behavior if allocation 
amounts are less than 10% in all three treatments.
4 
The second candidate is the principle of Strict Egalitarianism which promotes the 
allocation of identical levels of material goods and services for every person.  We consider a 
rather naïve form of egalitarian behavior where all monetary entitlements will always be shared 
equally independent of all other characteristics. In particular, individuals adhering to such 
principles of distributive justice would always like to split money endowments equally, 
independent of the process of entitlement. We define behavior in our experiments to be 
egalitarian if allocation amounts are 50% in all three treatments.  
  Our third candidate is Locke’s Natural law/Desert theory. Locke’s theory proposes that if 
an individual spends effort on the accumulation or development of resources, it is a part of 
natural law that the individual deserves an entitlement to that resource because he has "mixed his 
labor" with the resource. An individual who holds a Lockean theory of distributive justice should 
then behave in a self-regarding manner whenever he perceives that he has "mixed his labor" with 
a resource and allocate all to the partner whenever the partner puts the effort instead. 
Accordingly, we define a strong version of Natural Law if allocation in OE is zero and allocation 
in PE is 100% and a weak version of Natural Law behavior if OE/PE < 1.  
   The fourth and final candidate principle is the libertarian principle of distributive justice. 
Instead of proposing any pattern of distribution, the libertarian principles focus on “just” 
acquisitions and exchanges. The theory posits that all distributions are just as long as individuals 
are “entitled” to their holdings. Nozick (1974) exposited an "Entitlement Theory" consisting of 
three criteria in a completely just world. First, a person who acquires a holding in accordance 
with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
5 Second, if a person who 
acquires a holding in accordance with the “principle of justice in transfer”, from someone else 
entitled to the holding, the recipient is entitled to the holding. Third, no one is entitled to a 
holding except by (repeated) applications of the first and second criteria. When we consider 
behavior motivated by libertarian principles, there are two possibilities. A strong libertarian 
behavior is consistent with the observation of zero allocation in all three treatments since in all 
three cases the allocator is endowed with an amount by the experimenter and none of the 
principles of just acquisition are violated. However, it is not clear how a subject would perceive 
the PE treatment. On the one hand, the allocator is entitled to take allocation decision in the 
experiment and he (or she) may very well allocate nothing for the receiver. In that case, behavior 
in PE is indistinguishable from behavior under strong Utilitarianism. However, libertarian 
principles share with the desert based principle the notion that one has a right to the proceedings 
from one’s own labor. As a result, it is plausible that subjects might like to respect the receiver’s 
effort and propose a positive amount. Accordingly, behavior under libertarian principles can also 
suggest that allocation amounts are zero in OE and I but positive in PE. Alternatively, a weak 
version of the libertarian principle would suggest OE/PE<1 and I/PE<1. 
                                                            
4 Our choice 10% is a more conservative allocation level compared to what is typically observed in dictator games 
(See List 2007 for a discussion on average allocation amounts). 
5 The principle of justice in  acquisition was inspired by Locke’s idea that everyone ‘owns’ themselves and, by 
mixing one's labors with the world, self-ownership can generate ownership of some part of the material world. The 
principle of justice in transfer was designed to specify fair contracts and ruled out situations of stealing, fraud, etc. 5 
 
Based on the above discussion we set up seven hypotheses (see Table 2). Pooled results 
from the two countries suggest that the data does not support utilitarian, egalitarian, or libertarian 
ideas of distributive justice.
6  Instead, the behavior suggests a weak version of the natural law at 
play (see Figure 1).  
Next, we analyze gender differences in allocation amounts in our mixed gender-pair 
environment. 
Male allocators:  We do not find any difference in average allocation amounts in I and OE 
(p=0.98). However, we find that allocation amounts are lower (weakly significant) in I compared 
to PE (p=0.09).Allocation amounts are lower (weakly significant) in OE compared to PE ( 
p=0.08). 
Female allocators: We find average allocation amounts are lower in OE compared to I ( 
p=0.002), average allocation amounts are lower in I compared to PE ( p=0.006) and lower in OE 
compared to PE (p=0.000). 
Male allocation vs. female allocation: When we compare average allocation amounts of male and 
female proposers in our mixed gender environment in each treatment (see Figure 2), we do not 
find any significant differences in allocation amounts either in I (p=0.94) or in PE (p=0.3). 
However, average allocation amounts are significantly different between male and female 
proposers in OE (t test p=0.05).  
5. Conclusion 
We elicited fairness behavior of mixed gender pairs in dictator games where the entitlement 
procedure was varied across treatments. Our results suggest that different methods of 
entitlements can lead to different moral claims associated with it, and the same subject’s fairness 
behavior varies with the process of entitlement. We find that our data is consistent with a weak 
version of the fairness theories of natural desert. Subjects behave as if the moral claims towards 
endowments earned through own effort is the strongest. The claim is lower when allocating 
partners’ effort-based earnings. We find that female proposers are more sensitive to differences 
in treatments than their male counterparts (see Figure 2). We also find that in the Own Effort 
treatment, female proposers allocate a significantly smaller amount to their partners compared to 
male proposers. This seems to be consistent with earlier findings that report women to be more 
sensitive to the cost of sharing than their male counterparts (Eckel and Grossman 1996, Andreoni 
and Vesterlund 2001, Cox and Deck 2006). In our experiments the “cost” of giving can be 
argued to be higher in the OE compared to the other treatments due the real effort based earnings 
in that treatment. It is interesting to note that female proposers also seem to feel more strongly 
about their partners’ claims when the latter earns the endowment, although this is not statistically 
significant (Figure 2).  
Evidence from the two countries lend support to the idea that although there can be 
cultural differences in weighing the trade-off between self-interest and fairness, on an average 
the terms have similar meanings in different places (Konow 2003). Finally, we notice a curious 
difference in behavior of Indian subject pool vs. USA subject pools. Our results seem to suggest 
that allocators in US subject pool associate a stronger moral claim towards entitlements earned 
                                                            
6 A Krukal-Wallis test of population differences does not find any difference in the two samples (p = 0.16) 6 
 
through own effort than their Indian counterparts (p=0.04).
7 This can be indicative of cultural 
differences in process-based fairness considerations and can provide an interesting issue for 
further investigation.  
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Table 1: Session and subject information 
Country Sessions/matching Treatments  Subjects 
USA 2/within  subjects  Inheritance, Own-effort, Partner-effort 
 
(Treatment order: Session 1: I-OE-PE;   
 Session 2: PE-I-OE) 
 40 (20m,20f)
India 2/within  subjects  Inheritance, Own-effort, Partner-effort 
 




Table 2: Hypotheses, t test results   
  Hypothesis  Alternate hypothesis  Decision (p value) 
1.  Allocation is zero in all 
treatments. 
Allocation is not zero in all 
treatments. 
Reject (0.00) 
2.  Allocation is 10% in all 
treatments.  
Allocation is  >10% in all 
treatments. 
Reject (0.00) 
3.  Allocation in OE is zero  Allocation in OE is not zero  Reject (0.00) 
4.  Allocation in PE is 100%  Allocation in PE is less than 
100% 
Reject (0.00) 
5.  Allocation in OE/Allocation in 
PE =1  
Allocation in OE/Allocation in 
PE <1. 
Reject (0.00) 
6.  Allocation in I/Allocation in PE 
=1  
Allocation in I/Allocation in PE 
<1. 
Fail to reject (0.45) 












Figure 1: Average allocation (percentage) in the three treatments. 
 
 
Figure 2: Average allocation (percentage) by gender. 
 
 
Figure 3: Pooled (males and females) country results.  
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